

HUSSERL'S APPROACH TO TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY

A thesis submitted to
Brock University

by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
July 1978



James Lee Peterson, 1978

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For Elizabeth

CHAPTER I.

1. Introduction

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical solitude" in order that we may gain access to the mental life of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consciousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an "intentional" theory. We will then be able to see how it is possible to overcome transcendently the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego.

The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification.

First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy

does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given by a school, of a "point of view".¹

Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is

a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work of generations, really begins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights.²

Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with

¹Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74-5.

²Ibid. pp. 75-6.

the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution.

The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What is the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"?

If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the taken-for-granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent subjectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, if this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from which the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understanding impossible?

2. Historical and Eidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction

The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the possibility of experiencing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be "abstract" requires some explanation.

It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner.

It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between "eidetic" priority, and "historical" priority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.³

It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there having been so many millions of years for humans to believe in the existence of one another's ability to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but

³Cf. Maurice Natanson, The Journeying Self, a Study in Philosophy and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970).

rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble "why worry about it, it is always already engaged".

By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction.

The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the possibility of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rules" are the a priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-for-granted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellow-men, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations.

How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point,

absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism.

3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise.

Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly "scientific" philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science or "Mathesis Universalis".⁴ This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man.

This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based was not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate

⁴This term, according to Jacob Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline.

it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presuppositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.⁵

The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditions which underlie experience and render it possible.

Descartes believed that his Meditations had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy in his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home).

⁵Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff.

But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme?

Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice:

...at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6

Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes.

Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis for a "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge.

Such a method, Descartes found, was that, as indicated above by his own words, of "radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their validity."⁷ This is the method of the "sceptical epoche", the method of doubting all which had heretofor

⁶Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFleur. pp. 10.

⁷Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1970), p. 76.

been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy.

By way of this abstention of belief, Descartes managed to reduce the world of everyday life as believed in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the res cogitans. Thus, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God.

In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establishing a scientific, apodictic philosophy based upon presuppositionless groundwork. Husserl, in this regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that his starting place was not indeed presuppositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question in the performance of the epoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as a first, "absolute, indubitably existing tag-end of the world", and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute substance and the other substances which belong to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically valid deductive procedure.⁸

⁸Husserl, E.; Cartesian Meditation; trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

CHAPTER 2.

§4. The Phenomenological Reduction and the Reduced Sphere

In the course of the search for an absolute grounding for knowledge, upon which philosophical lines of thought could be built, Husserl was compelled to explore the nature of consciousness within a 'purified' sphere in order to assure his foundations to be ultimate. He sought, further, by means of exposing the invariant structures of consciousness, to provide an answer to the question of the how of our knowledge. Husserl in this regard approached the problem in a decidedly Kantian manner, utilizing the transcendental motif for finding the a priori structures of our knowledge. However, unlike Kant, who assumed the validity of the laws of Newtonian physics and proceeded to undertake his epistemological investigations given these laws as facts, Husserl insists that if there is to be a true "science" of knowledge, the methods of that science should conform to their objects.⁹ Phenomenology, Husserl believed, is just such a science.

Phenomenology is a science based upon the inherent "intentional" nature of consciousness. At this point we shall consider it sufficient merely to say that "intentionality" refers to the directedness of consciousness to and from its object, which is a result of the fact that consciousness by definition is consciousness of some object or other.

⁹ It should be noted that Husserl intends that this principle be adhered to regardless of the "science" in question, be it sociological, anthropological, economical, etc.

The introduction of this concept now is necessary, as this is an operating principle in the course of our deliberations. The full meaning and significance of this term will become clearer as we proceed, indeed, a certain degree of self-explication by the function to which the term refers is unavoidable.

Intentionality is considered by Husserl to be an absolute legitimating foundation for the science of mental life, which aims at spelling out the possibilities which can or cannot be actualities, the impossibilities which cannot be actualities, and the necessities which must be actualities. In essence this programme is that of the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being grounded upon absolute foundations. We intend, in subsequent sections, to outline the pathway to this "wonder of all wonders" viz., pure transcendental subjectivity, as opening the way to the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity. We shall approach our goal through the use of the paradigmatic case of perception, to which other modes of experience relate of necessity.

Unlike the epoche of Descartes, where the existence of the world is provisionally denied (with the exception of certain mathematical entities), the phenomenological reduction seeks rather to "put out of play" the existential status of every type of conscious object. Essentially, this is the act of taking no position whatever with regard to affirmation or denial of a given object's existential character. An "object" here is intended as that broad term with the inclusive sense of whatever may be the topic of thinking, discussion, perception, etc.

Therefore, objects in this sense are anything which is given to consciousness through an act or acts of consciousness and as such may or may not be perceptual in character. It is the goal of phenomenology to give an account of objects of every type, and each with its essential and appropriate objectivity in terms of the knowing subject. Each object is characterized as being in some manner "typified", and this typification reflects the level of being which belongs to the object. This "level of being" is defined by the "ontic region" to which each type of object belongs. It is imperative that each object be grasped in the most originary manner of presentation possible in any given region of objectivity. We can see, for example, that the Statue of Liberty may be viewed in visual perception under various circumstances, or conditions of presentation, e.g., at night, at high noon on a clear day, through a dirty window, in a fog, etc., clearly, the optimum conditions for viewing the statue is defined (relatively) by the second case. And so on with other types of objects:

Suppose I want to discover the originary presentation of either a lighter or of mental life. What I would not do, forthwith, can be instructive. I would hardly proceed to mow my lawn, get a haircut, build a boat, in order to obtain an originary encounter with that cultural-practical instrument, 'lighter'. Nor would I simply sit and 'look' at it, or touch it etc. I would use it, for just this mode of its being presented to (experienced by) me as tool is the originary mode for that noematic character. If I were interested in its color, however, no amount of use would as such be relevant; only looking at it under as optimal conditions as possible would do. Similarly for mental life: to have it directly presented under the best possible circumstances, I must not go swimming, drink tea, fly kites and so on, but turn to the 'thing itself' in the way through which it is itself presented, and experienced directly--reflection.¹⁰

¹⁰Richard Zaner, The Way of Phenomenology, (New York; Pegasus, 1970) p. 143.

The phenomenological reduction gives the integration of consciousness into the real world as one among many other mundane spheres, rendering consciousness no longer a property of the world dependent functionally upon events in that world. If consciousness can be considered unique after the reduction, and therefore possess an absolute logical priority with regards to experience, then consciousness is seen as a "medium of access to whatever exists and is valid."¹¹

With the invocation of the phenomenological reduction, the existence of the world and its contents are not denied, these contents are not simply straightforwardly accepted as existing, but are reduced to phenomena presenting themselves as this or that. These phenomena can have their existential character attached only insofar as they present themselves to consciousness as existing. These phenomena are intended thus as meaning that which attaches itself to them as part of the apprehension of their meaning; therefore Husserl:

"As radically meditating philosophers, we now have neither a science that we accept nor a world that exists for us. Instead of simply existing for us--that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing in its existence--the world is for us only something that claims being. Moreover, that affects the intra-mundane existence of all other egos, [so that]... naturally I lose [along with this] all the formations pertaining to sociality and culture. In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is. ¹²

¹¹Aaron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne, 1964), p. 166.

¹²Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditation, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 33.

The world, other men, and social institutions are reduced to the phenomenal stream of consciousness, experienced by me as mine. In this way the interpolar nature of consciousness is revealed. We have, on the one hand, an act of consciousness, e.g., in the mode of perception the act of perceiving, and on the other hand, that which is grasped by the act; that which is perceived. While we can concentrate, in the course of our deliberations, upon either of these poles of apprehension, these components of an intentional presentification are ultimately mutually irreducible. Every cogitatio, or conscious act, refers necessarily to its "meant" object which comprises the acts content.¹³ Genuine knowledge must be based upon the apprehension of objects as they show themselves to be. The phenomenological reduction, in this way, presents a world to consciousness in a pristine state, as openly it itself.

The importance of this is clear. In order for us to grasp the meaning of whatever object we are considering, we must show how that object is constituted in consciousness. Our analysis then serves us as the clarifying methodology with regard to whatever type of object we seek to illuminate. Once we have accomplished the detachment of consciousness from the transcendent world, we have in effect reduced the world to a world purely as meant. Husserl describes the situation metaphorically: the ego in the natural standpoint is "interested" in the world, however when the phenomenological reduction is invoked there

¹³Ibid., p. 33.

occurs a "splitting of the Ego, where the phenomenological ego is a disinterested onlooker" set over and above the ego of the natural standpoint. After a transcendental reflection on this "splitting" which also requires a disinterested attitude, it is clear, says Husserl, that "the Ego's sole remaining interest is to see and to describe adequately what it sees, purely as seen, and what is seen and seen in such a manner".¹⁴

This gives us the distinction between the empirical ego, or concrete self, and the consciousness to which this ego presents itself.

Obviously, it can be said that, as an ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental ego, and that I know about this only by executing the phenomenological reduction. ¹⁵

We can mention in passing at this point, that the reduction has left something over to which all our subjective phenomena must necessarily relate back to in terms of possibility, namely, the Transcendental Ego as phenomenological residuum. This Husserl claims is the region of Pure Consciousness, something which is (necessarily) untouched by the active invokation of the phenomenological epoche.¹⁶ However at this point we are not able to enter into the controversy surrounding the existential status of the transcendental ego, and further, any attempts

¹⁴Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁶E. Husserl, Ideas I, trans. Boyce Gibson (London: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 113, *passim*.

to do so in the present context would be misplaced.

After the bracketing of the general thesis of the natural standpoint, we may say that each and every object which is apprehended by consciousness, whatever its mode or nature, becomes accessible to us only through acts of consciousness which we are now actually engaged in (active intendings), or could now actually become engaged in (passive intendings).

§5. The Perceptual Noema as Something as Meant

Within the corpus of the reduced sphere objects are presented to consciousness as objects which have attached to them a certain meaning.¹⁷ These objects are objects to which the meaning prima facie "material thing" accrues. However, the apprehension of any given material thing within the reduced sphere must be characterized as presenting itself perspectively, that is, as a one-sided adumbration. My perception of, for example, this apple as meant as existing material apple is necessarily a one-sided state of affairs, and while I intend the apple as a unitary identical material thing, I am given only a single face of it; i.e., the back and the bottom are unavailable to my view. This one-sided manifestation which relates back to the transcendent material thing is the perceptual noema, which, properly speaking, is the meaning of the perception as such just as it lies immanent in the experience.¹⁸

¹⁷We are here confining ourselves to the example of visual perception.

¹⁸Husserl, Ideas I, p. 258.

We can see that there is an open-ended multiplicity of perceptual noemata for any given material thing, and this material thing presents itself through a multiplicity of noemata as being meant by those noemata. However, while any single noema refers to the self-identical material thing in terms of meaning, it can in no way be considered as the identical 'real' thing, for successive noemata present themselves as distinguishable. If each noema, or one sided presentation of an object were identified with the material thing, we would have as many material things as we had perspectival views of what is intended as unitarily identical, which is absurd. While a multiplicity of acts yielding different aspects of the same thing refer to one identical object, these noemata can differ insofar as their content is concerned. On the other hand a single noema can be 'had' through a multiplicity of acts temporally separated. It is possible to illustrate this by citing the example of one intending the same object but blinking ones eyes while doing so.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes between the how and the what of that which is intended. He uses the terms "quality" and "matter", respectively in the first case (is it remembered, or imagined, or seen); and in the latter, what actually is presented. Later Husserl translates these terms into 'the character of perceptivity', which, like quality, describes the mode of givenness in a presentation; and the 'central noematic nucleus', which defines the content of the mode. It can be clearly seen that while there is a mutual dependency between these two concepts, one can be altered greatly without

affecting the other. To illustrate; I see (mode) this enteric beggar (noematic core); I remember this enteric beggar; I imagine this enteric beggar; and so on. In each of these cases the character of perceptivity has been altered, but the central noematic nucleus has remained the same as referring to a specific enteric beggar. Likewise, I am able to alter the central noematic nucleus at will within any given mode, e.g., I see this house, I see this tree, etc.

The perceptual noema has a status in the ideal realm, existing on a plane along with meaning in general, void of temporal and spatial characteristics:

The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--the meaning of this perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence--cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties. 19.

The perceptual noema has no "properties" in the sense of properties of a material thing, it cannot be burned, dissolved, drop-forged, made into a vse, etc. If the object to which the noema as meaning refers is destroyed, one can no longer have a perception of it, there can be no actualizable perceptual noema of it; but of course it can be remembered or imagined as appearing from a certain perspective corresponding to a way in which the object may once have appeared.

The phenomenological reduction serves to bring to the fore the

¹⁹Husserl, Ideas I, p. 260.

noematic side of consciousness. When we speak of an "appearance" we do not thereby mean to indicate that there is a charismos between the appearance of a thing and the thing itself. The difference to be found here is the difference between a single component of a system and the system itself. An appearance of a thing is a single instance of a totality of possible instances of the appearance of that thing, together which comprise the identical thing. To be sure, a certain amount of expectation or anticipation of future co-possible appearances through which the thing may show itself are at least operatively at play here, and to this we shall return, however, what is important here is the implied induction of a self-contained system of possibilities all of which present themselves to be, to a greater or lesser extent, possible manifestations of a single identical thing, and together determine that thing.

§6. Ideation and the Appresentational Function of Consciousness

The case of identical meanings in numerically distinct positings leads Husserl to the problem of universals. We recall that phenomenology is intended to be the study of the general essence of consciousness, along with its multiple structures, all of which presupposes the conception of general essences. General essences, for example "extended things", are given only as a foundation of the apprehension of particular examples:

it is certain that no essential intuition is possible without the free possibility of directing one's glance to an individual counterpart and shaping an example, just as contrariwise no individual intuition is possible without the free possibility of carrying out an act of ideation and therein directing one's glance upon the corresponding essence which exemplifies something individually visible. 20.

Phenomenology as an eidetic science of consciousness is based upon determining the generic types, as opposed to factual particulars, and requires no necessary reliance upon any factual states of affairs in order to validate or invalidate its findings. The results of the eidetic sciences are in no way dependent on factual matters regardless of type but make assertions only concerning ideal possibilities, sub specie aeternitatis. There is no necessary relationship, therefore, between eidetic assertions and their mutual interconnexions as system of possibility and actual experience, however, all experience must conform to the generic conditions of possibility for any experience as revealed through eidetic relations. Which is to say that the possibilities of actual experience participate in the relations of ideal experience, but one need not study factual experience in order to have these ideal relations revealed.

We we have stated previously,²¹ the objects of consciousness fall into a clearly defined region of typicality. The essence of each region has associated with it a specific regional eidōs which determines the

²⁰Husserl, Ideas I. p. 56.

²¹See page 14 supra.

axiomatic relationships and categories which define the a priori structures common to all types of objects which fall under the regional ontology associated with any given eidos. For example, under the regional eidos "material thing":

"Regional ontologies" are, for example, geometry, considered as geometry of space, and not yet under the formalized idea of "Euclidean manifold", and the different branches of mathematical physics such as kinematics and analytical dynamics. 22.

We are concerned here, according to Husserl, with the "conditions of pure possibility", viz., those laws which reveal themselves to be valid universal generalities, and as such are 'previous' to all factual states of affairs:

Every actuality given in experience, and judged by the thinking founded on experience, is subject insofar as the correctness of such judgements are concerned, to the unconditional norm that it must first conform with all the a priori "conditions of possible experience" and the possible thinking of such experience: that is, with the conditions of its pure possibility, its representability and positability as the objectivity of a uniformly identical sense. 23.

The question remains as to how we go about gaining access to these eidetic relations given that factual matters have no validating function with regard to the a priori structures which we are looking for. For this Husserl uses the method of "free imaginative variation", or the method of "essence intuition", which is the same thing.

In the course of performing this peculiar type of "intuition",

²²Gurwitsch, op.cit., p. 190.

²³Husserl, Experience and Judgement, p. 353.

we must first imagine a particular case of a particular class and then freely alter it in our imagination. If certain structures remain invariant throughout our random alteration of the character of the object in question, we are able to single out those invariant structures as comprising the eidetic laws pertaining to that class of objects. It should be noted that the variation which the object in question undergoes should not confine itself to actual states of affairs as we are seeking the foundational structures of possibility. We can, however, consider real objects, but the real existence of that object is irrelevant to the performance and results of the process of phantasy variation as the only concern here is that of the form imaginatively taken as a "what", any "what" which is able to reveal a priori structures.

In free imaginative variation a particular conceivable content, e.g., a cup on this table, cannot be isolated from the horizontal context as though it could exist in no context. Rather, one can vary the context as much as one pleases. Thus we can only imagine that this particular content is isolated.

In the case of mutual foundation, e.g. colour and extension, there can be no variability of one content without a reciprocal alteration of the other. Therefore, in this case, each contextual content varies according to the variation in its mutual content.

Now, there are certain conclusions which become clear through the application of the principle of ideation. The first of these is the essentially appresentational character of apprehension in general.

As was made clear in the last section, perception takes place from

a point of view. A thing may be near, or it may be far, and as Heidegger points out, the relative proximity of that which is near to that which is far need have no necessary relation to measured distance from the perceiving subject:

Above all remoteness never gets taken as a distance. If farness is to be estimated, this is done relatively to the deseverances (Entfernungen) in which everyday Dasein maintains itself. 24.

The point which Heidegger is making in quite a different context than our own, is that something may be very "close" to us, e.g., the glasses on our faces, in measured distance, but at the same time they may be actually, concernfully, intentionally further from us than the plane which we are watching land in the distance through them.

Things are presented from a single perspective which gives perception a manifestly adumbrational character. For every material thing there corresponds a multiplicity of perceptions, each different from any other. However, each of these multiplicities, while different from endless others, agree with those others in that each adumbrational presentation is experienced as a perceptual consciousness of an identical thing.

There is, then, an essential insufficiency in every single noema which is discoverable via the application of free imaginative variation to the possibility of an imagined seeing of any possible perceivable object. Take for instance the perception of a cube; we find that even

²⁴Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York; Harper and Row, 1962), p. 140.

in the imagination our object presents itself in a one-sided manner. Further, by imaginatively "walking around" our cube we are exposed to successive "views", and we find that each successive view "anticipates", so to speak, other compatible possible further perceptions of this material thing, this cube. Each further perception from another point of view bears a reference to all other harmonious possible perceptions of that particular material thing. Naturally, the range of further compatible possible perceptions is narrowed as we begin to actualize other views from other perspectives. The conclusion of all this can be stated as follows: The one-sided view of a material thing in perception qua this one-sided view of this particular material thing points to the single perceptions constituting further perceptions of the identical material thing. No single perception of a material thing may occur without referring to further perceptions:

an empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that looks "all-round" its object, and in doing so is continually confirming the unity of its own nature, essentially and necessarily possesses a manifold system of continuous patterns of appearances and the perspectival variations in and through which all objective phases of the bodily self-given which appear in the perception manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua. 25.

The one-sided manner in which perceptual objects are presented to consciousness indicates the way in which intentionality passively points beyond what is immediately given: there is a "multiform horizon of unfilled anticipations, ... contents of a mere meaning, which refer us

²⁵Husserl, Ideas I, p. 131.

to corresponding potential evidences".²⁶ Each component content of the perceptual process (pertaining to a material thing) exceeds previous phases through harmonious agreement and complementation of them. Further aspects are passively anticipated as an endpoint towards which all previously apprehended noema approach.

That which the "mere meaning" which Husserl is alluding to above points to, this potential evidence, is imperfect insofar as it is not a now fulfilled or adequated anticipation of further aspects of, e.g., the other side of this orange; and furthermore this type of expectant synthesis can never be completely fulfilled. Moreover, this kind of expectant synthesis can in fact be frustrated, so that further evidence of aspects of the object either do not exist, or are different from what was expected (someone has glued one-half of an apple to the other side of my orange).

§7. The Additive Coalescence of Noemata into a System. The Open-ended Horizon of Possible Noemata

In order for a series of conscious acts to become a single process thereby revealing a material identity, the noemata must be grouped into a complementary, and thereby harmonious and coherent system. However, these conscious acts need not be performed in an uninterrupted manner in order to be unified, just as the corresponding noemata need not present themselves in succession in order to be harmonious and coherent

²⁶Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 61 (italics mine).

with relation to one another. Unification takes place when the noetic acts actualize and correspond to the noemata. The noematic system which is apprehended in a continuously perspectival manner, and which a priori sets the necessary conditions for experiencing a material thing qua material thing is a paradoxical experiencing: while I am aware of the one-sided presentation of any material thing, organically and systematically synthetically this perspectival is overcome, such that what is experienced is not this one-sided apprehension of a noema pure and simple, but rather the identically constituted material thing qua the meaning this material thing. One may in this respect (at least prima facie) say that Husserl follows Kant in suggesting that synthesis is a basic feature of human life. One might use the formula that a seeing is combined with a remembering which is connected with a past expecting and anticipatory future horizons which may or may not be fulfilled. There is, then, a constant process of identification and distinguishing going on.

The process whereby we apprehend a material thing through the on-going process of distinguishing and harmonizing noema to accommodate further aspects can be enlarged continuously to include in the noematic system depicting the meaning of the material thing additional noemata added by means of anticipating or actualizing further aspects of the formal material thing, or by perceiving it from other heretofore untried points of view, or under varying conditions. Additional information is, so to speak, gathered about the thing which is integrated into the system of meaning rendering the system more and more sharply defined and

determined. This gradual determining activity is, however, inexhaustible--it is an open-ended possibility that can never be completely fulfilled. There is always a hazy zone of indeterminateness which is left over:

What is actually perceived, and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (to some extent at least), is partly pervaded, partly girt around with a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality. I can pierce it with rays from the illuminating focus of attention with varying success.... Moreover, the zone of indeterminacy is infinite. The misty horizon that can never be completely outlined remains necessarily there. 27.

While this could apply equivocally to the "outer horizon" of a material thing, i.e., those other material things which are contextually implied here with what Husserl refers to as the "inner horizon"; that is, the inexhaustibility of knowing all aspects and attributes of a material thing with absolute certainty, such that the zone of indeterminacy would be absolutely determinate. This "imperfect presentation" is always, and necessarily a direct result of the essential nature of thing-perceiving: i.e., that a material thing can only always be presented in one of its aspects, with more or less copresent indeterminacies surrounding this perceptual "core", this core which changes according to the mode of presentation which in the course of changing points ahead to possible manifestations of the thing presented while retaining past perceptions which coalesce into the unity of the

²⁷Husserl, Ideas; p. 102.

now actual perception, such that the "thing" evermore presents itself according to new aspects or by rehearsing old ones.²⁸ Further:

the indeterminacies define themselves more clearly to turn at length into clear data; contrariwise, what is clear passes back into the unclear, the presented into the non-presented, and so forth....In principle a margin of determinable indeterminacy always remains over, however far we go along our empirical way, and however extended the continua of actual perceptions of the same thing which we may have treasured. 29.

Husserl claims that it is "logically possible" that a world transcendent to experience really exists inaccessible to human comprehension. However, he frames a controversy concerning the kinds of evidence necessary to ground such an assumption.³⁰ This controversy revolves about the actual apprehension of a transcendent object as it really is through perception, "experienceable ... as the demonstrable unity of its systematic experience". But Husserl claims that a world experienceable beyond the world given in actual experience is "non-sense". To be sure, the apprehension of a transcendent object, or, if you will, a 'thing in-itself' would involve necessarily the experiencing of the totality of the object all at once, which contradicts the foregoing delineation of the a priori reasons why no single perception is able to reveal the thing determined exhaustively en bloc.

²⁸Ideas, p. 137.

²⁹Ibid., p. 138.

³⁰Ideas, p. 149ff.

§8. Transition to Act Orientation, the Impulse of Transcendentalism

Throughout the previous sections we have confined ourselves primarily to a single pole of the perceptual process (as the paradigm of any conscious process), that is, the appearance of an object along with its meaning as conveyed by this appearance. We must remember that a "turn toward the object", with which we have busied ourselves, implies a correlative "turn toward the subject". These two structures of conscious apprehension are inextricably caught up with one another, and further, are mutually irreducible. The problems which concern this parallelism between the structures of revealed objective referents and the many acts which apprehend them are transcendental problems. These problems seek to found the object in the acts and come to grips with the correlation between subject and object.

We propose at this point to make our subjective turn after some preliminary material and, so to speak, discover the truth which "in interiore homine habitat."³¹ To do this we shall examine the noetic side of consciousness which will lead the way to constitution in general.

³¹ Carterian Meditations, p. 157 (Augustine as quoted by Husserl from De Vera Religione.)

CHAPTER III.

§ 9. The Passive Co-determining contents of Noematic Sense in Thing-perception

In the end of the previous chapter we discussed the continual refinement in the determination of the meaning which accrues to an object as more and more manifestations of the object are combined with the system of previous harmonious perceptions of the object. At this juncture we wish to bring more carefully to light the meaning of "inner horizon," which, in the appresentational nature of consciousness, the object in its single noema points, through meaning, to further determinations of the object either anticipated or remembered. These co-present determinations, which, so to speak, "define" for us the object as we apprehend it, comprise the system which is the meaning of the object just as it presents itself.

When, sitting here at our desk, we hear a sound, it is immediately apprehended as that sound emitted by a propeller-driven airplane. Further, hazy though it may be, an image of a plane can be made more or less clear to us, even though the sound is the only manifestation perceived by us. The plane is large or it is small, it has one, two, or four engines; the wings are above or below; the landing wheels are out or retracted. Now while it is not necessary for me to experience this kind of vague imagery in order to identify the sound as that belonging to a plane, I can, and often do, form an image of the plane and several of its co-present determinations even though they are decidedly not

visually perceived. These constituents of the plane indeed contribute to the meaning bestowed upon the sound and aid us in projects regarding the object. However, in the common pale of perceptual circumstance no images will arise and the sound will be experienced as simply "plane in general" with the co-determining constituents passively experienced as images which merely could be presented as the object of an appresentational act related to the sound. Husserl:

The individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of "possible perceptions", insofar as what is actually perceived "points" to a systematic multiplicity of all possible exhibitings belonging to it harmoniously. 32.

In most cases appresentational expectation and pointing will be towards typical structures of the object, in our example, the general lines of a plane, and not to the colour or exact wing shape.

We are not, however, indicating that an object can be apprehended through a single perception; the single perception merely provides the core toward which determinateness, of varying degrees dependent upon the familiarity one has with the object, gravitates. In all cases there must be some appresentational function in every presentation, i.e., the given perception must always be able to point to other aspects of the object; to assume otherwise would deny our previous conclusion that the perception never coincides with the object.

³²Husserl, Crisis, p. 162.

§ 10. Transition to Noetic Analysis; the Concepts of "Hyle" and "Noesis". Conflict and Doubt. The Problem of Non-inherent Organisation of "Raw" Sense-data.

In a manner quite reminiscent of Kant, Husserl, at the juncture of his "turn toward the subject" makes a distinction between a manifold of diverse, pre-unified data, and the intentional "Function" which unifies them and bestows upon them an objective status. This manifold of raw data, which he calls "hyletic" or "material" data, include such high order general contents as sound, touch, colour, as well as the "sensile" impressions, such as pleasure, pain, and so on.³³

These hyletic data has no meaning in and of themselves, and subsequently have no objectivating function. We are reminded, in this connexion, how the manifold elements of the phenomenon in Kant must be operated on by the a priori pure forms of sensibility in order to achieve the status phenomenon as unitary objects. Indeed, Husserl uses a similar notion by introducing the objectivating and meaning bestowing acts. These acts are the "noeses" through which an object may become an object as meant in one or another mode. Expressed in a Kantian manner: The noeses are the operative functions which work upon hyletic data in order to organise it and bestow upon it its meaning.

To simplify: hyletic are the matter to which noetic acts give form. To be sure; Husserl leaves open the possibility of a "formless material" or an "immaterial form".³⁴

A fair example might be found in the previous section concerning

³³Ideas, 246ff.

³⁴Ibid., p. 247.

the sound made by the airplane.³⁵ When I apprehend the sound it immediately has the meaning sound-of-an-airplane, as opposed to the sound-of-a-bird, etc. What is apprehended is not a mere tone or simple auditory datum, but rather a specific meaning revealed through an intentional act. The sounds here merely serve as conveyers of meaning, meaningless in and of themselves.

This revelation leads us back to our earlier discussion of appresentation, but also introduces a notion particularly germane to our theme. While the concept of the "organisation" of hyle by noetic acts is not Husserl's expressed turn of phrase, it would seem reasonable to refer to intentionality's function in this way if only because Husserl does claim that hyletic data hold nothing within their nature which might give rise to this kind of objective referent rather than that one (e.g. the symbol: + could refer either to mathematical operation or a supernatural event). These "elements contain nothing in themselves which is intentional."³⁶ The implication would seem to be that the same set of raw data could refer to two or more meanings, which brings into play the ever-present possibility of conflict and doubt.

The doxic or "belief" character of objects may alter with a change in the mode in which the object is presented. Further, we find that this doxic character is inextricably caught up with the nature of

³⁵Supra, section 9.

³⁶Ideas, loc. cit.

intuitional presentations insofar as the positing of the perceptual objects as real is concerned. To be sure, all "thetic" acts undergo conceivable alterations as to the force of the belief character which accompanies them:

The way of "certain" belief can pass over into that of suggestion or presumption, or into that of question and doubt; and according to the line taken, that which appears will adopt the ontical modalities of the "possible", the "probable", the "questionable", and the "doubtful" respectively. 37.

This process of "passing over" certainly has no particular direction (that is, either in the direction of strengthening or weakening the belief character), but is directed by the continual and harmonious development of the system of meaning which accrues to an object through a temporal succession. Gurwitsch poses a remarkable example of this (which for our purposes is preferable to the one which Husserl himself provides in the Ideas):

In a display window we see what seems to be a living person. The perceptual process develops harmoniously for a time, its phases in agreement with one another [strengthening]. Then, at a certain moment the further progress of the process is impeded [weakening]. We are no longer certain whether the object is a living person or a dummy. The perception of a living person is not supplanted by that of a clothed dummy. Rather, the two perceptions conflict and alternate with one another; one outweighs the other only to be superseded, in turn, a moment later; neither succeeds in prevailing definitely. Throughout the conflict, the same sense-data are experienced, but they are differently apperceived. 38.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 297.

³⁸ Gurwitsch, Field p. 270.

While this example shows a familiar circumstance, and stays with Husserl's intentions, Gurwitch goes on to point out that there may be something wrong with Husserl's assumptions. "Conflict", he says, "presupposes something identical for which there is competition."³⁹ Moreover, the implication seems to be that for a single group of hyletic data to yield two possible interpretations, the organisation must of necessity be imposed upon the group from without. The certainty factors imposed upon that data seem relative to some "true" perception of the facts implying a privileged perception.

At this point it is not necessary to go into the details of the "constancy-hypothesis", and, in fact, this path may lead us astray. However, it is interesting to note that Gurwitch offers an alternative which may be useful in our ultimate deliberations.

Gurwitch puts forth the idea that an identical thing is a function of a definite location in space rather than an ambiguous group of raw sense-data. Presumably, in the case of his example, if the group of raw data, taken alternately to be: person, store dummy, were placed on the sidewalk in broad daylight, the conflict in appresentational meaning would cease, and the belief character would unquestionably become that of one or the other interpretations. The neokantian Ernst Cassirer would appear to agree with this "identity of location":

In a purely intuitive sense, a colour seems different,
it looks different as soon as, taken representatively,

³⁹Ibid. p. 270.

it is moved out of position, as soon as it is seen not as a surface colour, but as a plain colour or conversely. 40.

Hyletic materials are questionable in view of the programme Husserl set up for himself, as well as the sense of transcendental constitution which he wished to bring about. Unlike Kant, to whom the constitution of an object was a static affair describing the structure of objects presented to intuition, Husserl desired to arrive at a notion of constitution which would reveal the creative process whereby transcendental subjectivity builds each of its objects, each with its own static constitution.⁴¹

The existence of such hyletic material ... involves of course the dependence of transcendental constitution on factors independent of the ego ... preserving at least a strong realistic element in the very heart of constitutive phenomenology. 42.

In order to come to grips with constitution as an active and changing process, we must focus our attention on the noetic acts of intentionality as well as the terminal pole of all such acts, viz., the transcendental ego.

§ 11. Reciprocity of Noesis and Noema; Sufficient Transcendental Conditions for the Existence of Material Things

Noematically objects present themselves one-sidedly, however, on

⁴⁰Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. III "The Phenomenology of Knowledge", trns. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1957), p. 136.

⁴¹H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement Vol. I, (2nd ed.; Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 146ff.

⁴²Loc. cit.

the side of the act, that is, noetically, there is a corresponding function to the interdependent possible perceptions of the object. These are the appresentational acts of retention and expectation. These are anticipatory acts which point beyond to aspects of the object not given in the present perception.

These anticipations are not completely vague pointing to any kind of future perception of the object whatever, rather they are expectancies which adhere to the harmonious typification of past expectancies which have been fulfilled or altered through non-fulfillment. Future presentations of the object are expected to fit into the general structural pattern "hinted at" by which is now presented and what has been presented. This is a predetermination which, while imperfect insofar as its inner horizon's exhaustive determinability is concerned, is determinate with respect to the general style:

For example: the die leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already construed in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps never take place), is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the "horizon." As contrasting with mere clarification by means of anticipative "imaginings", there takes place, by means of an actually continuing perception, a fulfilling further determination (and perhaps determination as otherwise)--but with new horizons of openness. 43.

We find that there is a genuine reciprocal correlation between

⁴³Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 45.

intentional acts and the noematic manifestations of the objects which they apprehend. Initially, our discussion took out of play the conscious side of thing-perception in order to investigate the a priori structures of any kind of object which is to be presented under the heading "material thing". Now, we have disengaged this noematic concern and have turned toward the acts which grasp the noema. We discover by taking this turn that the single perceptions, by which a material thing announces itself being related as static interdependent constituents of the object, have a noetic equivalent in the function of pointing beyond what is now actually given through expectancy and anticipation. Further, when these expectancies of other constituents of the object are fulfilled harmoniously we have arrived at the point of the sufficient transcendental conditions whereby a material thing may be taken as existing.

§ 12. The Results of Our Perceptual Investigations, and Their Extension. Transcendental Constitution. Transcendental Clues

We have laid out the conditions for material identity as a synthetic interaction between noesis and noema. The act of identification is, furthermore, "the fundamental form of synthesis."⁴⁴

Husserl distinguishes between internal time and objective time; the former referring to the temporality associated with all subjective

⁴⁴Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 41.

processes, and the latter referring to the temporality associated with the noematic object in the world. Internal time, the time associated with the act of perceiving, is the vehicle for the changing appearances of an identical object synthetically unified. This unity is not a simple unity of contiguous impressions, but rather an internal unity related to a single identical ego in which the "constitution" of the object as self-same comes about.⁴⁵ The identity of the object "resides" in the ego not as a part, as if a marble were in a box, but "ideally" as an immanent intentional appearance.

The object can be grasped in different modes, but the consciousness crosses the line between them all, and gives rise to consciousness of identity regardless of the diverse modes in which the object is intended.

Conscious synthesis, to be sure, is not an isolated incident unifying this object and that, but rather unifies the "whole of conscious life". Through internal time the stream of consciousness, past, present, and future, are synthetically unified into a single all inclusive cogito, the seat of all possibilities and actualities.

We discover that identity is the gift of intentionality. Because consciousness is made an egological unity, we find that it is suitable as an object of an all-embracing cognition itself. This is the act of contemplation or reflexion. The consciousness of internal time makes this pre-eminent unity of consciousness into ego possible.

⁴⁵Loc. cit.

We have explicated the way in which concrete objects can be known in perception. It is important to point out with Husserl⁴⁶ that the specific acts of perception provide what he refers to as "transcendental clues" to formal universality. We can, in short, generalize our findings as to type and extend them to the entire range of conceivable objects. Each type as a "material ontological particularization" can be investigated in its own right (e.g., res extensa, or, what is more important to us, animate being).

To investigate these types is the task of transcendental theory. Husserl writes:

transcendental theories arise that relate...to human beings as such purely as intended in possible consciousness, and transcendently as...constituted in the transcendental ego. 47.

"Objects" are all constituted within the transcendental ego as their structure, giving rise to a rule which determines the range of other possible consciousness of the object and still yielding an identical object.⁴⁸ The transcendental ego is the sphere of possibility of all types of objects which are for me conceivable, each according to its type, region, and structure. Transcendental subjectivity is not, as Husserl points out, a chaos of admixed particular types; but rather an all-embracing sphere in which the constitution of all conceivable, actual objects are inter-related in a single idea, the idea

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 52.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 54.

of the limits of possible human imaginableness.

The ego lives as an identical structure throughout all of the ongoing field of cogitationes, and in that way relates all particular objects of consciousness synthetically back to a single biographical "I" as a substratum of all conscious acts.

The "concrete ego" is a monad in the Leibnizian sense, which is actually "in" the process of intentional life. It is the actualization of the ego's possibilities.

§ 13. The Appropriation of Our Theme: Transcendental Intersubjectivity

In the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl attempts to set aside objections that transcendental phenomenology, by virtue of the reduction of the meditator to "absolute transcendental ego" leads to an inescapable solipsism.

He proposes to respond to this objection and others by systematically unfolding the meaning of "alter ego" in the transcendental sphere, in much the same way in which we have unfolded the experience of the perception of the material thing. He writes:

We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter-ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of the transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations the sense of other ego becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner. 49.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 90.

In the following chapters it will be our task to explicate the meaning of the alter ego from various points of view, beginning with the egological programme of Husserl, which is the fountainhead of subsequent criticism and expatiation.

CHAPTER IV.

§14. The Transcendental Reduction to the Sphere of Ownness

We recall that our first phenomenological reduction was to have confined us to the stream of consciousness, its processes, along with their abiding synthetic unities. We may properly say that these unities are part of, and inseparable from the transcendental ego.

Now we must lay down the pathway, while remaining in the phenomenological sphere, "from the immanency of the ego to the transcendency of the other."⁵⁰ In order to do this we must seek what Husserl refers to as the "transcendental clue" to the conditions necessary in order to experience other egos as such. In grasping this clue we must determine the ontic region and type to which this kind of experience lends itself.

The best clue is found in the straightforward examination of Others just as we find them in the reduced sphere. What we find is that they are not simply objects in nature, but apparently psychically governed from within themselves. Paradoxically, we discover them to be objects in the world, but at the same time they are subjects for the world, to the extent that I experience the same world as they, and in fact an an object for them. We find that we have stumbled upon an intersubjective world, available to everyone.

I must, however, adhere to the contention that if the world has

⁵⁰Cartesian Meditations, p. 89.

meaning for me, this meaning is constituted as part of my intentional life, unified synthetically and having its verifiability grounded in harmonious apprehensions.

In order that we may follow our programme, according to Husserl, at this juncture we must perform a peculiar kind of epoche; one that will bring into our phenomenological brackets all reference to other subjects, i.e., the subjects themselves, all cultural objects, tools, etc.

This is a secondary epoche with regard to the intersubjectivity theme within the nexus of the transcendentially reduced sphere. The object of this further epoche is to reveal the sense of "ownness", or that which belongs exclusively to me given the confines of my present "world". We are to abstract from others such that I "alone" remain.⁵¹ This secondary, "ownness" epoche will exclude all synthetic effects of intentionality related to other egos. We will find, says Husserl, a "mirroring effect" in my ego, a reference to an analogue of the I-myself; a reference to an alter-ego.⁵²

In the performance of the "ownness epoche" we take the approach that what is to me peculiarly my own is simply not-alien. Our task is to detach the alien from the horizon of transcendental experience in that:

A property of the transcendental phenomenon "world" is that of being given in harmonious straight forward experience; accordingly it is necessary to survey this world and pay attention to how something alien makes

⁵¹ Cartesian Meditations, p. 93.

⁵² Ibid., p. 94.

its appearance and jointly determining the sense of the world and, so far as it does so exclude it abstractly. 53.

What we exclude is everything which is "spiritually transcendent." Besides this the observation that there is a surrounding world available for everyone should not be forgotten, but excluded abstractly from any consideration.

Now, by and through this abstraction we discover that the founding stratum of our coherent stream of consciousness remains; that is, world experience as such qua harmonious inter-relationship between noesis and noema continues, but experience of transcendent others, i.e., what is alien to experience in this instance has no objective sense. Objective nature, experienceable by everyone disappears. Within this unexpurgated sphere we find along with the objects included in it there is constituted an object unlike others, that is, my own animate organism, unique, to which I ascribe kinaesthetic motion. This is the only body in my reduced sphere to which I ascribe and characterize by fields of sensation.

"Kinaesthesia" becomes a central concept in the development of Husserl's examination of intersubjectivity. Indeed, later in the Crisis, it provides the ground for what he calls the "lived body" (Leib) in his exposition of the "life world." The life world becomes more and more important to the form of his philosophy; Husserl comes to believe that the world of everyday life is paramount reality from which all conceivable philosophical inquiries must make their start.

⁵³Cartesian Meditations, p. 95.

The notion of kinaesthesia revolves around the "reduced" ego's ability to be both perceiver and the perception with regards to its own organism, governed psychically from within. These are active perceptions which are described by an "I can" or an "I am doing," even in the case of holding still.⁵⁴

In the context of criticizing the Kantian notion of "sensibility" with regards to bodies in general in the Crisis, Husserl points out that the ego lives in and through its organism, and that the unity of the kinaestheses is what is at bottom of the experiencing of all bodies.

Within the nexus of the sphere reduced to "ownness", the living body, i.e., that which the ego governs psychically from within, is the only body which can, by virtue of its kinaestheses, be perceived as living; "alien" bodies are capable of being perceived of only as bodies in the physical sense.

All of the foregoing does not preclude the possibility of experiencing what is other. Indeed, we have only distinguished between these unities which constitute what is my own as reduced psycho-physical ego, and the multiplicity of objects outside of me. The differentiation itself remains constituted my psychic being.

It is at this point that Husserl asks what the relationship between the human ego confined to its sphere of ownness, and the transcendental ego as that which unifies and constitutes the "world," is. The answer is that by performing the "ownness epoche" and finding what is "not

⁵⁴Cartesian Meditations, p. 97; Crisis, p. 106.

alien" we have found something which is transcendently secondary. For here, everything which is other is screened off; however, while what is other is distinguished from what is my own, a consciousness of it remains, and this fact throws the "other" back into the stream of consciousness with the sphere governed by the transcendental ego. Thus the "transcendental ego constitutes ... the 'objective' world, as a universe of being that is other than himself by means of the notion of ownness, and constitutes at the first level, the other in the mode: alter ego."⁵⁵

When we first considered the notion of ownness and gave it the sense, "that which is not-other" we were bound to a merely indirect notion of alter-ego. But to clarify ownness it is necessary to bring out its positive characteristics.

We recall, from our relatively lengthy discussion of the conditions for the possibility of perception of objects in general, that if a particular object is grasped in intuition perceptually it acquires determination and original unity through a systematic unfolding of harmonious perceptions of it. The identical, the core, fits in the object's "own" determinations.

This is applicable to the perception of my "own" ego. Husserl writes:

I am given to myself perceptually as this ego in a grasping perception. Furthermore I become aware that, although not grasped before this perception, I was

⁵⁵ Cartesian Meditations, p. 100.

"already given," already there for myself continually as an object of original intuition (as perceived in the broader sense). But I am given, in any case, with an open infinite horizon of still undiscovered internal features of my own. My own too is discovered by explication and gets its original sense by virtue thereof. 56.

However, by self-perception we do not mean to indicate that the ego is presented just as, e.g., an object is apprehended visually. That which can be perceived directly is that which constitutes the ongoing, present, living, stream of consciousness. Thus, sensu stricto that which about myself is discovered perceptively is that which is found in the living present. However, more can be explicated about this ego non-perceptively. Merely note that the ego is grounded in a more or less clear recollection of the past or anticipation of the future. The non-perceptive originary determination of the ego is found in possibilities rather than living actualities related to the current of past retentive and future protentive temporality. In short, I discover the horizon of my temporal being, which is not discoverable in the mere perceptual mode.

Up until this point, the most we could say in characterising that which belong properly to the ego as its "own" was by means of an explication of that which was not the ego's "own". We can now say that that which is essentially the ego's "own" is that part of the actualities and potentialities of the stream of consciousness which is pre-given and immediate to the stream of consciousness. Naturally this includes even

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 101.

the consciousness of what is not properly the ego's "own":

All possibilities of the kind subsumed under the I "can" or "could have" set this or that series of subjective processes going (including in particular: I can look ahead or look back, I can penetrate and uncover the horizon of my temporal being)-all such possibilities manifestly belong to me as moments of my own essence. 57.

Thus the sphere of ownness contains not only the systems of noemata which form the synthetic unities of material and eidetic objects, but these constituted unities themselves insofar as they are inseparable from the consciousness which constitutes them.⁵⁸

It is important to state at this juncture that the secondary epoche in effect restricts us to a kind of objectivity which lies on a lower plane than an objectivity which is there for everyone, and which, as such, can be confirmed by everyone. The distinction is that between that of an objectively transcendent material world and a transcendent world which is immanent in me, i.e., which belongs properly to the ego as its own. This is the thing as identical thing as pointed to through harmonious noemata as opposed to an Identity which corresponds to that attested to by a consensus of perceiving subjects. We have, in this way, arrived at the world as meant as transcendent.

The world which we have uncovered within the secondary epoche is that which is a priori to the higher order "external" world. We are now involved in how this "founding" strata gives rise to that which is not its own.

⁵⁷Cartesian Meditations, p. 102.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 103ff.

§15. Appresentational Transfer of Kinaesthetic Sense

We have succeeded in disclosing, by way of our purified consciousness, a stratum from which consciousness has been purged of reference to any other ego. Moreover, we have purged it of anything which does not belong to the ego as its own.

It may be helpful at this juncture to remember that Husserl acknowledged that the alter ego is essentially, and in principle, inaccessible, and that "empathetic evidence...excludes in principle originary verification (Ideas I § 140)." Our problem then is to disclose the kind of constitution which supports the higher-order intersubjective life-world, the world which gives rise to the idea of objective nature and which as such "involves essentially a "'harmony' of the monads".

The Other is, as we have said, not given directly as originary evidence. The essence of the other ego's can never be given directly to our experience:

If what belongs to the other's own essence, were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I would be the same. 59.

Something therefore mediates that relationship between the ego of the other and my sphere of ownness which allows for its presence to be known and further, verified. There must be an intentional act, related to other intentional acts, which makes the ego of the other "co-present"

⁵⁹ Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.

with my own immanent sphere, something which appresents the ego within the body of the other.

We should point out that this kind of appresentation is somewhat different from that which can be fulfilled in the case of the perception of a material thing. In the latter case we can verify directly that which we have appresented in the past, by expecting and by then having our further perceptions of the object conform to our expectations. In the case of the appresentation of the alter ego, however, the expectation can never be directly redeemed.

What occurs then is something like this: within the twice reduced sphere I am able to single out a body unlike any which present themselves to me, to wit; my own organism, to which I ascribe "fields of sensation" and kinaesthesia. My organism is discovered to be unique in that it alone is the only body which can be disclosed to me originally, immediately as an animate organism. Now, let us assume a man enters our field of vision. His body becomes part of the ego's own, part of its immanent transcendency, and given that my body is the only "animate organism", the sense of animate organisms which I ascribe to the body of the other must have occurred indirectly, mediateely; through what Husserl refers to as an "apperceptive transfer of sense." I ascribe to his body, as it appears, the sense of animate organism which I ascribe to myself; however, this sense is meant as belonging to the body of another.⁶⁰

Unlike Descartes' theory on the perception of others (which we

⁶⁰Cartesian Meditations, cf. pp. 109 ff.

shall go into at greater length later), Husserl's is not a case of reasoning by analogy, even though an analogy is involved. Indeed, there are other types of intentionalities which involve similar mediate determining. Husserl calls this type of mediate co-presenting "associative pairing" which is the primal form of passive synthesis, in which two different things provide the basis for similarity. He will even go on to say that:

Each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. 61.

§16. Appresentational Pairing: The Associative Synthesis

In order that I may obtain a body, as an immanent transcendancy, upon which the sense "living organism" overlays by virtue of its similarity to my own living body, the original from which the sense "motivated by an ego like mine"; to wit: my body, must be present originally, immediately, or, as Husserl puts it, "livingly". We acknowledge that what is transferred analogically, i.e., what is appresented, can never, as we have said, be brought immediately to consciousness. Were this possible there would be no difference between my ego and that of the other, which convolutes the entire problem.

What occurs is always the result of an "associative pairing," the fundamental form of passive synthesis, that upon which other related types

⁶¹Cartesian Meditations, p. 111.

of constitutive syntheses are grounded, not necessarily belonging to the problem of intersubjectivity per se. From the other type of constitutive synthesis which we have spoken about, viz., identification, the synthesis of association is distinct, however related. It involves a mutual transfer of sense in a simultaneous presentation. This is the case where two seeings are similar but not phases of one another.

In this case two salient data are presented to consciousness upon which an overlay of sense is imposed one to the other which is immediately and passively intuited. Subsequently, a coincidence of sense between the two objects accrues to each to a greater or lesser extent (total coincidence being the case of absolute likeness). Therefore the meaning of each is interrupted in light of the meaning which is shared by the other, provided evidence actualized in one or the other does not hinder or cancel the sense transfer.

Richard Zaner provides us with the simple example of two objects imagined on a field of homogeneous grey.⁶² A round red spot appears followed by the appearance of a square red spot. When the second, square, spot appears I focus on it, thus while intending the "red square spot", the "red-round spot" is retained as such (as perceived already with its specific sense.) It is at this point that the overlay occurs:

Remembering...the tendency of consciousness to pretend operatively, its own further continuance as typically like what its past has been, we note that the happening

⁶²Zaner, Richard; The Way of Phenomenology; (Pegasus, New York) pp. 147 ff.

of phase two at once fulfills and fails to fulfill
what phase one protended. ⁶³.

The second spot which is intended tends to partially verify the evidence offered up by the first spot. It fulfills the expectancy by: 1) being a spot; 2) by being red; and 3) by being perceived visually. The sense of the first spot is transferred and confirmed in the second spot, while the sense "round" fails to transfer, thus the expectancy with regard to this quality fails to transfer. Consequently we end up with two senses: the first round-and-not-square; the second square-and-not-round. We see from this that if a body enters my visual field which is similar to my own body as "lived", then an association cannot help but occur linking the sense of my body as "containing an ego" or "governed from within", with the intuited similar body, so that the sense "governed by an ego from within" may accrue to it.

Just to what extent the notion of similarity can be applied to the relationship between my body and the body of the other we shall pursue in the following chapter which devoted to a critical look at all this. Let it suffice to say at this point that clearly I do not perceive my own body in the same manner in which I perceive the body of the other.

⁶³Ibid., p. 149.

§17. Harmonious Verification in Intersubjective Appresentational Transfer

At this point we may borrow the notion of "harmonious appresentation" from the investigations of the nature of the perception of material things in general which we have conducted earlier.⁶⁴

As we have said, the belief character of the object in question (in this case, the organism paired with an ego like mine) is strengthened or weakened through behavior consistent or inconsistent with expected behavior; the system of meaning so accrues to the object developing through temporal succession. Here the transfer of sense is based upon the experience of ourselves as psychically governed organisms.

The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious "behavior." Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfilling in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior. 65.

What can be never experienced originaliter, i.e., the ego of the other, is precisely what is not properly of the ego, whatever can be presented, in a word redeemed, belongs to the ego. The ego of the other becomes constituted in me through what is presented and verified originaliter as another monad.⁶⁶ Husserl draws, at this juncture, the comparison

⁶⁴Supra, pp. 38 ff.

⁶⁵CM p. 114.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 115.

between the intentional modification of the recollected past throughout the continual verification of it, and the constitution of the other in the present via its modification qua a system of meaning in the present. In this respect the other ego becomes a modification of my own.

§18. Bodily Centricity and the Analogue of Position

My animate organism is given to me in the mode of "Here", that is, from the perspective of the space which I at present occupy. All other objects, in this respect, are "There", i.e., in the mode of occupying a space which I at present do not. However, due to my freedom with regard to the altering of position via kinaesthesia, I am able to alter my "here", and correspondingly the "there" character of other objects.

In the case of an "other's" body, that body is always "there" with respect to my "here". I am in principle capable of occupying any space I choose, given the limitations of facticity, which I do not presently occupy, i.e., I can make any "there" a "here" simply by going there. clearly, I can perceive from "there" just as I perceive from "here", only from an altered perspective. This has been shown through our discussion of the verifiability of identical objects seen perspectively.

By co-presenting the body's "here" with the other body's "there" the sense of the ego who's "here" is my "there" accrues. The other thus has the sense of other ego in the mode of "there."

Natanson points out in this connexion that:

Within the transcendental sphere, the heres and theres are identical, and the attribution of bodily placement

in the world is the consequence of an intentional process whose source is the pure ego. The other is not restricted in this way to a figment of my transcendental consciousness but is granted full objectivity in his interrelationship with me in what might be termed a transcendental community. 67.

While this transcendental intersubjectivity exists solely in the sphere of my own ego, the non-originary presence of the other ego appresented within this sphere reveals itself to be a complete monad, introjected, as it were, into my reduced transcendental sphere.

From this bridging of two monads is transcendentially derived the community of monads which comprise the generic conditions for the taken-for-granted intersubjective world of the natural attitude. Furthermore, the constitution of a truly objective nature as we have said, implies the community of monads with harmonious spheres of apprehension.

§ 19. The Movement to Re-examination

We have disclosed the structures which gave rise to the notion of the other ego from the point of view of our paradigmatic case, namely, that found in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, particularly, as set out in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations.

While it is somewhat beyond the scope of our present work to delve into the constitution of society at large, along with its cultural products, it may be said in passing that the common nature of a community of egos is established out of the simple case of the relationship between

⁶⁷Natanson, Maurice; Edmund Husserl, Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. 100.

the I and the Thou. Just as the primal case of the constitution of the other as a monad constituted in me, so the community of others as community of monads are constituted in me. The extension of the problem of the constitution of a transcendental "we" based upon the bridging of the ego and the other is the source of problems which will motivate the discussions in the next chapter. Indeed, we are to ask if Husserl has succeeded in establishing what he set out to establish, and moreover, if the framing of the problem of intersubjectivity within the transcendental sphere is not in principle self-negating.

CHAPTER 5.

§ 20. Interrogating the Transcendental Intersubjective Motif

By looking back to trace the efforts of Husserl to constitute transcendental intersubjectivity, it is possible to note a great many problems, some of which are quite fundamental with respect to his framing of the "problem", as well as his approach. Indeed, it is not without reason that we have used Husserl as our paradigmatic case. The entire question of intersubjectivity's place and explication within the ever-widening battleground of phenomenology must necessarily bring the questioner back to Husserl's attempts, be they found successful or not.

It is on this note that we shall embark upon posing questions, and indicating particular problems with Husserl's treatment of the matter as we have laid it out in this essay. An in depth, critical appraisal of each and every point will not be possible due to the limitation of space and reasonable time. However, the problem can be framed in the context of the treatment given to the problem by other philosophers. Moreover, we may be taken to the fundamental point of disagreement among those who disagree.

The most obvious question is that of the necessity of coming up with a transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity at all. To be sure, the apparent reason for Husserl's efforts in the first place seem to revolve around a response to those who would say that phenomenology leads to solipsism. It can be pointed out that in the course of what we may refer to as the "first" epoche it seems that intersubjectivity is

given, not eliminated, as one of the founding structures of the sense of psychic life. It is only after the artificial suspension of

the hidden intentionality of the founding mundane intersubjectivity, and eliminating, by means of the [second] reduction, [can] the essential content of the world accepted by me as world for everyone... 68

give the appearance of solipsism.

This point will be discussed further in our look at Ortega y Gasset's analysis of the problem.

In the second place, it would seem that some of the clear, nay, apodictic results of the use of Husserl's method in delving into the sense structure of psychic life with regard to perception and self-consciousness become obscured and compromised in his attempts at constituting intersubjectivity transcendently. It is almost as though Husserl was forcing a square peg into a round opening.

The internal dynamics of the last of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations leave much to be desired in view of his avowed claim of presuppositionless philosophy. Particularly unconvincing is the idea that I transfer the sense which my body has for me to that of the appearing other by means of its similarity to my body. Clearly I do not, indeed can not, perceive my own body in the same way that I perceive the body of the other. Let it suffice to say at this point that I go throughout life without ever having seen much of my body, consequently certain perspectives of the other's body are potentially alien to me and therefore

⁶⁸Schutz, Alfred; Collected Papers vol. III (Husserliana) p. 83.

resistive to any sort of overlay of sense as in Husserl's theory, also, the overlay of sense between male and female in terms of a transfer of fields of sensation becomes problematic.

We shall be discussing the problem of dissimilarity of appearance with the introduction of Sartre's concepts of the "corps pour moi" and the "corps pour autre" in conjunction with Ortega y Gasset's analysis of the problem along with his criticism of Husserl's notions of appresentative transfer of sense as applied to this specific problem.

We shall also ask after the proper role of the transcendental ego. Indeed, is the transcendental ego appropriate to the study of intersubjectivity, or is it a question-begging intrusion? Can we speak of a plurality of transcendental egos, or is there ipso facto only one? We shall follow, in this connexion, A. Gurwitsch's proposal of the possibility of a non-egological theory of consciousness.

Finally, does the failure, if there is a failure, of Husserl's attempts at constituting transcendental intersubjectivity render phenomenology as a whole invalid? Moreover, has Husserl altered the sense of "constitution" after performing the "second epoche"?

§ 21. Reasoning by Analogy and the Priority of Self and Others

We begin our thinking about Husserl's conclusions, the criticisms of it, and possible alternatives, by returning to our ostensible starting place: the thought of Descartes.

What holds true for Descartes, namely that if thinking about

oneself is the measure of certainty then I am the medium of access to the world, holds equally true for Husserl. This being the case, then how does Descartes account for other people?

It is our intention here to merely sketch out the general position Descartes in this regard and to bring into play whatever is deemed necessary. However, we may begin by remarking that the manner in which Descartes frames the problem is within the context of determining whether this machine-like thing is really a human being. In order to determine this, a judgement is necessary.

Descartes begins by doubting the situation in which he finds human beings; it is not inconceivable that they are machines. The point of departure, then, is doubt, I can measure the indubitability of what I see against myself.

A "body" for Descartes is "all that can be bound by some figure" (Second Meditation) and which can be moved by impulse. With this in mind, we may say that the body is a corpse, with no "entelechy," it must always be moved by something outside of it. The human body, then, is a corpse with a mind. Descartes distinguishes between the philosophical way of viewing the body and that of the natural attitude. Thus, philosophically, the body is a corpse, the result of removing oneself from the situation.

Descartes believed that what we have access to in the mind is that which is dead. It is only when we find a way to consider something as though it were dead can we begin to understand it. The discovery here is that there can be matter without spirit, the result of starting with

the solitary, certain, thinking thing.

Philosophically, then, Descartes begins by considering other people as cadavers. But we should make clear (and distinct) that for Descartes I am not alone because I doubt the presence of other minds, but rather because I am alone to begin with. Descartes' task is to distinguish between cleverly contrived automata and human beings.

Let us go through Descartes' thinking at this point: I am a thinking mind, this I make known in words and gestures which testify to my mind. Now, another body confronts me. It responds to me in words and gestures. I conclude that governing the words and gestures there exists a mind like mine.

This is an example of reasoning by analogy. I have overcome my radical aloneness on the basis of which I doubted whether an "other" can exist at all by reasoning. Thus along these lines discursive thought becomes the origin of the social. Through reasoning by analogy and the observation of agility I judge that the other qua other thinking substance is truly real, like me. Moreover, because he is an ego like me, he shares in a rational community on the basis of which I can say not only what he is, but additionally, how he is.

However, what all this means is that, quite simply, Descartes, as does Husserl discovers others on the basis of oneself.

By looking at this simple conclusion we may find an opening for our discussion. Let us begin by stating that there is a great deal of evidence which would indicate that the notion that we discover others on the basis of ourselves is quite simply not so.

§ 22. The Intersubjective Views of Jose Ortega y Gasset

Gestalt psychology, which rarely examines the consequences of its descriptions, would suggest that there is a fallacy in the principle of reasoning by analogy. To be sure, the explicit result of this kind of research is that knowing the body from the inside out is qualitatively opposed to knowing others from the outside in. Moreover, the French gestaltist Henri Wallon conducted experiments which showed that the experience which a child has when looking in a mirror lead one to conclude that the derivation of community on the basis of the solitary is wrong. Wallon indicated that it is really quite late in the child's development that the child discovers the reflection of his own body. In fact, it was shown that if one were to stand next to the child in front of the mirror, he discovers first your image and then his own. If this is true then one does not reason by analogy. What would be true is that I discover myself on the basis of others.

One fundamental difference between Descartes' analysis and that of Husserl is that Husserl introduces the passive constitutive synthesis which avoids one of the most absurd results of Descartes' theory. This passive constitution permits an immediate response to the other as other human on the basis of its generic nature. The lengthy thinking process necessary in order to assess the humanness of the other in Descartes leaves itself open to the criticism that in sudden encounters with people we recognize them as hostile or friendly by means of gestures. The question is: do we ever react as though we place ourselves

in another's place on the occasion of experience? Inherent in reasoning by analogy is the idea that once I conclude that the other body possesses a mind like mine I must suppress that premise in order to arrive at an other which is indeed other; however, if I suppress that premise I do not have a mind like mine.

Ortega y Gasset suggests that we may well be in touch with other people before reasoning by analogy. One favorite theme of Ortega (as well as Sartre) is that man has no nature. Man is neither a body which is a thing nor a soul which is a thing. Indeed, in no sense is man a thing. In fact if we are to speak of man as a thing at all he is neither a res cogitans nor a res extensa, rather he is a res gestae, a gesture, an event, a happening or occurrence. Not only is human life not a thing, it further does not simply confront things, rather it supposes and presupposes things. What human beings encounter is the difficulty or ease in dwelling amongst things. This existing in dwelling amongst things is distinct from other things. The reason is that human beings have something to do, things have nothing to do. For Ortega human life is defined by one's doing commerce with the world.

Human life is not something given beforehand, it is a task to be performed, in which one continually makes one's own life. One's uniqueness is not something given beforehand, so that, as in Husserl, we must peel off the layers and structures of life in order to arrive at our own uniqueness. This presupposes that life is already there. However, in Ortega that uniqueness must be achieved simply because one's life depends upon it. Life is making, not made.

Human life in this view is its own cause, possibilities are not pre-given, they are discovered through commerce with the Other. My projects are always made vis a vis my Umwelt. There is a freedom in that I am not fixed in the world; there can, in fact, be multiple surrounding worlds. Animals carry their surrounding worlds around with them, while man can enter into many surrounding worlds, even simultaneously. Possibilities to be always lie ahead of us, what we were lies before us.

We are many things in the mode of 'having been' and that mode is always still alive; the 'having been' forms a gestalt coherence with what we are doing and that which we have to do. Accordingly, the having been of one's own life, or the life of a nation acts as a ballast on the possibilities which lie ahead (a notion clearly not alien to Husserl), even to the point of collapsing those possibilities, e.g.: we can no longer be positivists because we have already been positivists.

All of my knowledge has a social, as well as a personal connotation, consisting of a system of usages which pertain to beliefs, academic and otherwise. (For a life to receive the stamp of validity, time must pass). The past is already a social past attesting to the existence of other people.

In Man and People Ortega begins with the question: "What is the social?" In responding to it he notes that the fundamental difference between man and animals lies in the fact that man is characterised by "interiority" while animals are possessed by "exteriority."⁶⁹ It is

⁶⁹Ortega y Gasset, Jose; Man and People, trans. W. Trask (W. Norton and Co., New York, 1963), p. 17ff.

Descartes' discovery that man is capable of going within himself that Ortega is referring to, in contrast to animals who are purely possessed by what is other than themselves.

The animal is pure alteracion. It cannot be within itself. Hence when things fail to threaten or caress it; when they give it a holiday; in short, when what is other ceases to move and manage it, the poor animal has virtually to stop existing, that is, it goes to sleep. 70.

The ability to withdraw for man is not a gift, it is an achievement that must be protected and preserved. Human being, moreover, is peculiar because one can never be certain if that inwardness can be preserved. Man, unlike a brute, is never certain of his being himself, at every turn he may turn into something else.

For Ortega not only is the life of each of us unique and non-transferable, but it already includes a presumed belief in somebody else--at the very moment the uniqueness is discovered, the other is equally included. In our "radical solitude" we are only alone with respect to that from which we are alone. Uniqueness is inseparable from the notion of other people.

The power of man to withdraw into himself gives rise to two consequential extremes: intellectualism (contemplation) and voluntarism (stupification). The matrix which middles these extremes is sociality.

"Radical reality", that is, every day life just as we straightforwardly live it, is characterised by a "com-presence" (presence with)

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 19.

between man and his surroundings. Ortega is concerned with the law and structure of environment (in the broad sense). In this connexion we find a close agreement between Ortega and Husserl. Ortega would say that we conduct our lives according to the rules of appresentation which govern the inner and outer horizons of perception (in Ortega "figure" and "ground"). Further, as in Husserl (previous to the "second epoche"), Ortega would say that our environment reflects a system of social usages. However, in saying that we are oriented in our uniqueness so that we are the broadcasting center of our actions, or, so to speak, the "zero-point" of our environment, Ortega emphasises that we are each in a place where no one else can be. It is on this point that Husserl's analogical transference of sense will be criticised by Ortega. It is this point that the next sections will be discussing.

§ 23. Co-existence of One-another in Ortega

In following along the path laid down by Ortega we arrive at the pertinent point: "inter-individual life."

We may search our environment and come across many objects varying in type. Moreover, we may act "upon" many of these objects. We can, e.g., "act upon" a stone. We know some of its properties, we know we can grind it, break it, sink it in a pond, etc., but whatever action we take it "responds" only according to the action which we take - it "responds" absolutely mechanically. There is never a corresponding action on its part. There is, hence, a uni-directional relationship between the stone and I, but always in the direction of the stone.

In the case of one's encounter with animals, the situation is altered. We find that there is no longer only a uni-directional relationship. My actions towards the brute already presuppose some possible reaction on its part. It may bite me, run away, growl, etc. This anticipated re-action on the part of the animal presupposes re-action according to the system of meaning which such and such an animal inheres to in my experience. The stone is indifferent to my existence, to it "I am not"--there is no community. However, in the case of the animal there is a reciprocity in the relationship; I am to it, and it is to me. There is in this at least the beginnings of a "we" relationship.

At this juncture Ortega asks if the relationship of mutual co-responding is not what we really mean by the social? In response to this we note that while, in fact, the animal "co-responds" with me, he does so with an exhaustably limited repertoire. Thus we must ask: How do other men manifest themselves to me?

In responding to this question Ortega gives a remarkable answer in light of the answer which Husserl provided.

All that I perceive of the other is his body, a body which exhibits a particular behavior. Like the animal, this behavior hints at inwardness; however this behavior can never be directly experienced, or known with certainty. The body of the other becomes a sign of inwardness. Thus while the body of the other is just object among other objects, its behavior points inward, its "expression" hints at inwardness. The inwardness is therefore appresented, made com-present with the flesh of the body. Yet Ortega points out (as Schutz and Fink do), that while

the appresented other side of, say, an orange, has been or can be made present to intuition the inwardness of the other man can never be made present as such.

The body of the other, according to Ortega is an "expressive field"⁷¹ of something which may be immanent. Ortega notes that:

the life of the other is not patent reality to me as my own life is; the life of the other - I deliberately put this in loose terms - is only a presumption or a presumed or assumed reality; as probable, as plausible, as likely as you please, but not radically, unquestionable, primordial "reality." 72.

This fact, says Ortega, leads us to conclude that there are other "2nd class realities" within our radical, unique, primordial life. This is not to deny their reality, but simply to state that there are "2nd class realities" not of the quality part-of-my-radical-centric-life. By way of an example of 2nd class realities, we may point out the world constructions of the physical sciences.

From a different point of view, certainly a less critical one, we conduct our lives as though the other man's ego is not a 2nd class reality, but rather as part of the paramount reality of daily life. Normally, Ortega writes, the other is much a reality to me as my own life is.⁷³

We can say, then, that the other is highly ambiguous. It is both another life like mine, as well as being absolutely alien to me. With

⁷¹Ortega y Gasset, op.cit., p. 93.

⁷²Ibid., p. 95.

⁷³Ibid., p. 97.

Ortega's theory we can point out three general structural moments:

- 1) The stream of my own life in its radical solitude.
- 2) The mine which begins with my body (what is not mine is whatever resists me).

And most importantly:

- 3) Pure and inaccessible Other, which, however, announces itself to me.

Ortega agrees in principle with Kant and Husserl, who held that Objective nature is based on social relation in general in order to establish a common world for everyone, but specifically, that only with dealing with the other in successive coordinate experiences, does the objective world arise. However, Ortega says, men are "at one only in our vision of certain gross and coarse components of the world," but this is enough to lead us to conclude that there is one world for everyone. Moreover, this means that were it not for the other's inaccessibility to me, I would have no idea of what it meant to be objective. Only on this basis is there any for us. Objective nature, in and of itself, presupposes what Ortega calls "we-ity" (nostrity). Furthermore, if coordinate experience is the test of objectivity, this may indicate that the usage is the most objective sort of thing.

Let us digress for a moment to say that the foregoing discussion is a case of society being looked at from what Descartes referred to as the "philosophic" attitude. For Ortega this attitude can be made only artificially pure. The point is that we must not lose sight of the fact that for Ortega, in the paramount reality of daily life in

which we normally situate ourselves, notwithstanding certain excursions into the realm of radical reality (where we are now situated), the "first person" is always the last person to appear. In daily life, in fact, the life of the other may turn out to be more real than my own.

§ 24. The Body as "Sign"

Ortega writes:

the only part of the other man which is actually present to us is his body, but his body, being flesh, is a field of expressiveness, an almost inexhaustible semaphore of signal. 74.

It seems appropriate to mention that there is an interesting difference between the theories of Husserl and Ortega. Husserl bases the knowledge of the other-as-possessing-an-ego-like-mine upon the fact that he possesses a body which appears to be similar to mine (that is, as mine seems to me). Ortega, on the other hand, bases his acknowledgement of the other ego upon "expressiveness" or behavior (in the broad sense) on the part of the other's body which responds to me in complicated, and virtually inexhaustible ways.

Peripherally, Husserl's theory could not account for the appresentation of an ego in a non-human intelligent creature because we could not effect an appresentative transfer of sense to that misshapen form. Presumably, Ortega could account for this on the basis of gestures or on account of the pure expressiveness of this other's "flesh". We intend

⁷⁴Ortega, op.cit., p. 117 ff.

to point out, in this regard, that Husserl's theory can not really account for woman on the basis of a transfer of "sense" from a man's body.

Ortega criticizes Husserl on this point. Rightly, Ortega sees that Husserl's theory is based on an analogy; perhaps not strictly speaking on a reasoning by analogy; however, Husserl himself admits that an analogy is involved. Ortega goes on to assert that every analogy involves a correspondence of two terms to two:

In our case the analogical transposition would, according to Husserl, consist in this: if my body is body - flesh because I am in it - in the Other's body there must likewise be another I; an alter ego. The basis of this analogy, the common term - common in the sense of similar - would be my body and the body of the other. 75.

Furthermore, the other's body, according to this, is different from my body only by the fact that it is located there while I am here (a there, which, if I wished, I could make my here).

Ortega singles out two errors in this line of reasoning. The first consists in the fact that because my body through its living kinaesthetics is the broadcasting center of my actions, it differs greatly from the body of the other. There is no mere difference in perspective, much more is involved than simply that. My body is "seen" from within, it is my "property", my attribute. This is to say that I apprehend my life - the within is accessible to me, the without is not - in the case of the other the situation for me is reversed.

⁷⁵Ortega, op.cit., p. 123 ff.

The other, "scarcely smaller" error, arises in the case where the Other I confront is female, an other which "is not He but is She". It is unlikely that any associative transfer of sense could take place when the perceived other manifests itself as a feminine other. We see that the associative transfer of sense - the motivating supposition of Husserl's theory - is quite wrong:

the transposition of my ego, which is irremediably masculine, into a woman's body could only produce an extreme case of virigo, but it is inadequate to explain that prodigious discovery, the appearance of the feminine human being, different from me. 76.

The point of each of these two criticisms revolves about the fact that we do not know our bodies from within in any way which is similar to knowing the other's body from without. However, even if this were not the case, the other's body may be entirely different in shape, construction, and behavior from mine.

§ 25. On the Being-of-the-body-for-oneself and the Being-of-the-body-for-others in Sartre

While the element of mutuality between self and other evidenced in the writings of Jose Ortega y Gasset can not seem to be found in Sartre's explanation of our Knowledge of others, his distinction between how I live my body, and how I view the body of the other brings our point into clearer light. To be sure, it is not our intention to offer any in depth criticism of Sartre's theory, but merely to extract, hopefully without

⁷⁶Ortega, op.cit., p. 128.

doing damage to the text, that which bears upon our present study.

Sartre appears to suggest that confusing the body as it exists for oneself and the body as it exists for others is a direct result of holding on to the untenable Cartesian charismos between the body and the soul. The implication here is that Husserl, in his attempt to refute the charge of solipsism, may have restored the separation of mind and body, particularly when he asserts (at least implicitly) that the lived body must be viewed "objectively" in order to initiate the analogical pairing process.⁷⁷

Sartre states that knowledge of the world is based upon relations; human knowledge, in order to mean anything, must be from the point of view of some "here" and "now". Any simultaneous knowledge of the world from two perspectives by the same observer would lead to the collapse of distinction, orientation, and order in the world. There is a univocal relationship of things to my "here" and this in an orderly fashion.

Sartre goes on to point out that the body-for-itself is the "surpassed" body in-itself because it is mine. Consciousness (for-itself) treats the body in the course of acting in the world, as though it were not in-itself, as the body is the for-itself's necessary engagement in the world. The world can be considered my instrument, I can use it. However, if I consider my own body as an instrument, I would need an instrument even closer to control it. The further evidence for the basic integration of the for-itself into the surpassed body is the fact that I

⁷⁷Cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, par. 54.

cannot see my eyes seeing, for this has no meaning, nor can I feel the hand feeling. In fact, in all of these cases consciousness is right up to the object touched or seen. In the relationship of the hand to an object being felt the objectivity of the hand is nihilated. I am it. Sartre puts it well: "the body is lived it is not known." The body-for-me in Sartre is something overcome, something which I live or exist outside of.⁷⁸

We will now turn to the Body-for-others. Sartre points out that the body as it appears to others and the body of the others as it appears to me are tantamount to the same thing. The structure and meaning of each is reciprocal. Sartre goes on to point out that we do not learn of others on the basis of our own bodies:

The body is not that which first manifests the Other first to me. In fact if the fundamental relation of my being to that of the Other were reduced to the relation of my body to the Other's body, it would be a purely external relation. But my connection with the Other is inconceivable if it is not an internal negation. I must apprehend the Other first as the one for whom I exist as an object; the reapprehension of my selfness causes the other to appear as an object in a second moment of prehistoric historicisation. The appearance of the Other's body is not therefore a primary encounter; on the contrary, it is only one episode in my relations with the Other and in particular in what we have described as making an object of the Other. Or, if you wish, the Other exists for me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently.⁷⁹

Clearly Sartre is describing here the sphere of everyday life taken

⁷⁸Sartre, Jean-Paul; Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1969), p. 429.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 445-46.

to be the "primary" encounter with the other. What is interesting is that he implies that in order to view the other's body as such, I must suppress to some extent the egoic characteristics of the body (the concept of the body as encapsulating a mind is exactly that which Sartre is arguing against). This is a shift in orientation; the making of the other into an object, which primordially (straightforwardly) it is not in an encounter with him as a person.

The other is given as transcendence transcended. He is given as the center of the relations which comprise his situation. The other is never given as flesh.⁸⁰ For Sartre the other as ego (concrete) is given immediately; it is always already there. We are never given the other first as body and then as the center of his situation. Moreover, the body of the other is meaningful in relationship to that which it relates. The other's body is given as a "ground", meaning that:

- (1) I can never apprehend the Other's body except in terms of a total situation which indicates it.
- (2) I cannot perceive any organ of the Other's body in isolation, and I always cause each single organ to be indicated to me in terms of the totality of the Flesh or of life. Thus my perception of the Other's body is radically different from my perception of things. 81.

To see the other as purely object (among other objects) would involve an artificial de-integration of the other and his situation. Presumably, this would render the other meaningless and would relegate his constitution as alter-ego to the realm of the impossible.

⁸⁰Sartre, Op.cit. p. 451.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 453.

The body for others is the magic object par excellence
 Thus the Other's body is always a-body-more-than-a-body
 because the other is given to me totally and without
 intermediary in the perpetual surpassing of its facticity. 82.

Thus for Sartre all constitution relates, unlike Kant, with others first and finally with relationship to my self, whereas Husserl would be inclined to give each equal stature.

§ 25. Conclusion

We have sketched out in some detail the methods and results of Husserl's account of the constitution of the alter-ego within the broader nexus of his theory of cognition. It is clear that insofar as we have laid out the mechanics of Husserl's account, and offered objections and alternatives to it, our discussion remains incomplete. For in all of this we have failed to ask ourselves what Husserl's genuine intentions were in giving an account of transcendental intersubjectivity in the first place. It may turn out that while Husserl, in the exegesis of the development of his intersubjective theory, is culpable of some great errors, we may have missed the real importance of what he tried to do.

We must first and foremost remember that Husserl was interested in transcendental phenomenology. We must also remember that, unlike both Ortega and Sartre, Husserl was operating within the phenomenologically reduced sphere, and not in the natural attitude.

⁸²Ibid., p. 460.

The transcendental ego, it will be recalled, is not a property of the world; and the reduction to the stream of consciousness and the transcendental ego was intended to provide the constitution of the manifestations via acts of consciousness. As such it should be made clear that Husserl had no intention of offering a proof for the existence of others. Rather he was interested in the concept of meaning of the alter-ego, and to give an account of the sorts of acts which give rise to it. Moreover, this account was for the expressed purpose of providing a foundation for an objectively valid world. The motivation for Husserl at the beginning of the Cartesian Meditations was to show how objects are constituted intentionally with relation to the transcendental ego. The problem there arose as to the status of other egos for whom there are also objects.

It is our belief that part of the real importance of Husserl's investigation was to indicate that transcendentially the alter-ego does not have the same kind of status as other material objects in so far as they are given to consciousness as synthetic unities. In fact the very meaning of appresentation had to be re-dealt with in terms of an irredeemable appresentation. It further turns out that the alter-ego has an even more fundamental status than that of material things, a status upon which material things in an objective world are unselbständig. Thus it is not simply a matter of constituting the alter-ego which is the issue here, rather it is the constitution of the whole of the objective world.

By way of final criticism we may mention that with the effecting of

what we have referred to as the "secondary epoche" the very meaning of "constitution" has shifted without explanation from its sense prior to its invocation. Previous to this second "bracketing" within the confines of the first it appears that Husserl's notion of constitution, which hitherto had the connotation of an explication of sense within the reduced sphere had become a kind of search for a foundational structure of the being of the alter-ego. It occurs to us that this kind of search can only be conducted within the natural attitude and that transcendental phenomenology is in principle incapable of it. Such an analysis may well take the form of the Sartrean account, whereby, e.g., in the perception of the other we do not perceive a manifestation of the other's anger in his clenched fist and tightened jaw, from which we may conclude the existence of a transcendent alter-ego, rather we perceive an angry other originaliter. Naturally, what we are suggesting is that two distinct types of intersubjective inquiry can be made. First, that of transcendental intersubjectivity, the sense of which seemed to have escaped Husserl himself, and which should shed some light upon the conditions for the possibility of the experience of the other in terms of the explication of the sense of the world; and second, mundane intersubjectivity, which would be appropriate for the inquiry of the ontological status of the other, and any abiding "proofs" for their existence which may be found necessary to conduct. All this is to say that if the subject of the other is given, then it has not the character of the transcendental ego, we must appeal to the natural attitude to find it so. On the other hand, if the other is regarded as transcendental ego, he is in

principle incapable of being given, thus ontological questions tend to fall flat.

It is our strong feeling that Husserl found himself in the later phases of his life's work in profound need of a constitutive analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity. To be sure, the very objectivity of the world, and therefore the foundation of his epistemological deliberations insist upon it. It seems a paradox that he should conduct this apparently preliminary investigation after the spelling out of, and in terms of, his epistemology.

Probably one of the most annoying aspects of his examination of the transcendental sense of the alter-ego is that it is conducted in the context of the occasion of the other's presence. The question of the cooriginariness or non-co-originariness of intersubjectivity and objectivity is somewhat controverted herein. Husserl, in order to provide an account of his intersubjective sense of objectivity, believes, we are told, that the alter-ego is given in experience some how, but the problem is to show the other not as a mere worldly phenomenon, but as transcendental ego. The further question arises here as to the plurality of transcendental egos. Is there only one, an "ego-at-large" which is comprised of "factual transcendental egos"; and if so, to what extent are these two notions compossible?

In fine, while Husserl may have failed here insofar as his original projects are concerned, viz., philosophy as a rigorous, apodictically grounded science, it is clear that this failure was not due to any conscious abandonment of these projects. Furthermore, Husserl's attempt at

the transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity by its very failure brings to the fore the exigency, nay, the necessity of further like work. Finally, it is our contention that the failure of the illumination of the founding strata of objectivity in no wise topples or invalidates the magnificent discoveries which Husserl made with such care and precision in the area of the theory of cognition. It would indeed be strange if the whole of the "preparatory work of generations" could have been completed by Husserl himself.

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